The Works of Benjamin Franklin: Volume 7, Letters & Writings 1775 – 1779 – Benjamin Franklin, John Bigelow
It is easy to be persuaded that Mr. John Bigelow’s edition of ‘The Works of Benjamin Franklin’ is likely to be the most complete, the most scholarly and acccurate, the ‘Federal’ edition. Mr. Bigelow was confessedly the foremost authority on Franklin. Beside the material now in print, carefully collated for the present purpose, so far as possible, with the original manuscripts, he has had free use of the supplementary Franklin MSS. purchased by the State Department in 1881, and not published before his work, and the autobiography has been printed for the first time in any collected edition of Franklin’s Works, from the original manuscript, which was in Mr. BigeIow’s possession. Mr. Bigelow promises upwards of 350 letters and documents which have never appeared in any previous collection, beside a thorough revision of the text throughout, and a new, chronological, arrangement of matter. The notes and other editorial additions are limited strictly to the illustration of the text. This is volume seven out of twelve, covering letters and writings from the years 1775 through 1779.
The Works of Benjamin Franklin: Volume 7, Letters & Writings 1775 – 1779.
Format: eBook.
The Works of Benjamin Franklin: Volume 7, Letters & Writings 1775 – 1779.
ISBN: 9783849654047.
Excerpt from the text:
DXCVIII: AN ACCOUNT OF NEGOTIATIONS IN LONDON FOR EFFECTING A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE AMERICAN COLONIES (Continued.)
The 9th article was so drawn, in compliance with an idea of Dr. Fothergill’s, started at our first meeting, viz., that government here would probably not be satisfied with the promise of voluntary grants in time of war from the Assemblies, of which the quantity must be uncertain; that, therefore, it would be best to proportion them in some way to the shillings in the pound raised in England; but how such proportion could be ascertained he was at a loss to contrive. I was desired to consider it. It has been said, too, that Parliament was become jealous of the right claimed and heretofore used by the crown, of raising money in the colonies without parliamentary consent; and, therefore, since we would not pay parliamentary taxes, future requisitions must be made with consent of Parliament, and not otherwise. I wondered that the crown should be willing to give up that separate right, but had no objection to its limiting itself, if it thought proper; so I drew the article accordingly, and contrived to proportion the aid by the tax of the last year of peace. And since it was thought that the method I should have liked best would never be agreed to, viz., a Continental Congress to be called by the crown, for answering requisitions and proportioning aids, I chose to leave room for voluntary additions by the separate Assemblies, that the crown might have some motive for calling them together, and cultivating their goodwill, and they have some satisfaction in showing their loyalty and their zeal in the common cause, and an opportunity of manifesting their disapprobation of a war, if they did not think it a just one. This article therefore met with no objection from them; and I had another reason for liking it, viz., that the view of the proportion to be given in time of war might make us the more frugal in time of peace.
For the 10th article, I urged the injustice of seizing that fortress (which had been built at an immense charge by the province, for the defence of their port against national enemies), and turning it into a citadel for awing the town, restraining their trade, blocking up their port, and depriving them of their privileges. That a great deal had been said of their injustice in destroying the tea; but here was a much greater injustice uncompensated, that castle having cost the province three hundred thousand pounds. And that such a use made of a fortress they had built would not only effectually discourage every colony from ever building another, and thereby leave them more exposed to foreign enemies, but was a good reason for their insisting that the crown should never erect any hereafter in their limits, without the consent of the legislature. The gentlemen had not much to say against this article, but thought it would hardly be admitted.
The 11th article, it was thought, would be strongly objected to; that it would be urged the old colonists could have nothing to do with the affairs of Canada, whatever we had with those of the Massachusetts; that it would be considered as an officious meddling merely to disturb government; and that some even of the Massachusetts acts were thought by administration to be improvements of that government, viz., those altering the appointment of counsellors, the choice of jurymen, and the forbidding of town meetings. I replied, that we having assisted in the conquest of Canada, at a great expense of blood and treasure, we had some right to be considered in the settlement of it. That the establishing an arbitrary government on the back of our settlements might be dangerous to us all; and that, loving liberty ourselves, we wished it to be extended among mankind, and to have no foundation for future slavery laid in America. That, as to amending the Massachusetts government, though it might be shown that every one of these pretended amendments were real mischiefs, yet that charters being compacts between two parties, the king and the people, no alteration could be made in them, even for the better, but by the consent of both parties. That the Parliament’s claim and exercise of a power to alter our charters, which had always been deemed inviolable but for forfeiture, and to alter laws made in pursuance of these charters, which had received the royal approbation, and thenceforth deemed fixed and unchangeable, but by the powers that made them, had rendered all our constitution uncertain, and set us quite afloat. That as by claiming a right to tax us ad libitum, they deprived us of all property; so, by this claim of altering our laws and charters at will, they deprived us of all privilege and right whatever, but what we should hold at their pleasure. That this was a situation we could not be in, and must risk life and every thing rather than submit to it. So this article remained.
The 12th article I explained by acquainting the gentlemen with the former situation of the judges in most colonies, viz., that they were appointed by the crown, and paid by the assemblies. That the appointment being during the pleasure of the crown the salary had been during the pleasure of the Assembly. That, when it has been urged against the Assemblies that their making judges dependent on them for their salaries was aiming at an undue influence over the courts of justice; the Assemblies usually replied that making them dependent on the crown for continuance in their places was also retaining an undue influence over those courts, and that one undue influence was a proper balance for the other; but that whenever the crown would consent to acts making the judges during good behavior, the Assemblies would at the same time grant their salaries to be permanent during their continuance in office. This the crown has, however, constantly refused. And this equitable offer is now again here proposed; the colonies not being able to conceive why their judges should not be rendered as independent as those in England. That, on the contrary, the crown now claimed to make the judges in the colonies dependent on its favor for both place and salary, both to be continued at its pleasure. This the colonies must oppose as inequitable, as putting both the weights into one of the scales of justice. If, therefore, the crown does not choose to commission the judges during good behavior, with equally permanent salaries, the alternative proposed that the salaries continue to be paid during the pleasure of the Assemblies as heretofore. The gentlemen allowed this article to be reasonable.
The 13th was objected to, as nothing was generally thought more reasonable here than that the king should pay his own governor, in order to render him independent of the people, who otherwise might aim at influencing him against his duty by occasionally withholding his salary. To this I answered that governors sent to the colonies were often men of no estate or principle, who came merely to make fortunes, and had no natural regard for the country they were to govern. That to make them quite independent of the people was to make them careless of their conduct, whether it was beneficial or mischievous to the public, and giving a loose to their rapacious and oppressive dispositions. That the influence supposed could never extend to operate any thing prejudicial to the king’s service, or the interest of Britain; since the governor was bound by a set of particular instructions, which he had given surety to observe; and all the laws he assented to were subject to be repealed by the crown, if found improper. That the payment of the salaries by the people was more satisfactory to them, as it was productive of a good understanding and mutual good offices between governor and governed, and therefore the innovation lately made in that respect at Boston and New York had, in my opinion, better be laid aside. So this article was suffered to remain.
But the 14th was thought totally inadmissible. The monopoly of the American commerce could never be given up, and proposing it would only give offence without answering any good purpose. I was therefore prevailed on to strike it wholly out.
The 15th was readily agreed to.
The 16th it was thought would be of little consequence, if the duties were given to the colony treasuries.
The 17th it was thought could hardly be obtained, but might be tried.
Thus having gone through the whole, I was desired to make a fair copy for Dr. Fothergill, who now informed us that having an opportunity of seeing daily Lord Dartmouth, of whose good disposition he had a high opinion, he would communicate the paper to him, as the sentiments of considerate persons, who wished the welfare of both countries. “Suppose,” said Mr. Barclay, “I were to show this paper to Lord Hyde; would there be any thing amiss in so doing? He is a very knowing man; and, though not in the ministry, properly speaking, he is a good deal attended to by them. I have some acquaintance with him; we converse freely sometimes; and, perhaps, if he and I were to talk these articles over, and I should communicate to him our conversation upon them, some good might arise out of it.” Dr. Fothergill had no objection, and I said I could have none. I knew Lord Hyde a little, and had an esteem for him. I had drawn the paper at their request, and it was now theirs to do with it what they pleased. Mr. Barclay then proposed that I should send the fair copy to him, which, after making one for Dr. Fothergill and one for himself, he would return to me. Another question then arose, whether I had any objection to their mentioning that I had been consulted. I said none that related to myself; but it was my opinion, if they wished any attention paid to the propositions, it would be better not to mention me; the ministry having, as I conceived, a prejudice against me, and every thing that came from me. They said on that consideration it might be best not to mention me; and so it was concluded. For my own part, I kept this whole proceeding a profound secret; but I soon after discovered that it had taken air by some means or other.
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